Maryland Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1

Article 8

Capacity of Child to Secure Court Order Against
Father for Future Support in Excess of Amount
Stipulated in Separation Agreement Between
Parents - Yost v. Yost

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Capacity of Child to Secure Court Order Against Father for Future Support in Excess of Amount Stipulated in Separation Agreement Between
Parents - Yost v. Yost, 2 Md. L. Rev. 60 (1937)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/8

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

CAPACITY OF CHILD TO SECURE COURT ORDER
AGAINST FATHER FOR FUTURE SUPPORT IN
EXCESS OF AMOUNT STIPULATED IN
SEPARATION AGREEMENT
BETWEEN PARENTS
Yost v. Yost 1
Plaintiff-appellant-child, an infant of six years, by his
mother and next friend sued defendant-appellee-father in
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City praying the court to
pass a decree directing the father to pay the mother such
sum per month as the court might deem proper for the necessary expenses to be incurred by the infant.
The mother had obtained a divorce a vinculo matrimonii
from the father in Pennsylvania. Prior to the date of that
divorce decree, in the municipal court of Philadelphia, at
the suit of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania against the
father, an order had been passed directing the latter to pay
the mother the sum of $50 per month for the child's support.
This order incorporated a prior agreement between the
parties to that effect. Since that time the annual income of
the father had increased as also had the maintenance expenses of the infant.
The chancellor heard the case on demurrer and from an
order sustaining the same and dismissing the bill of complaint, an appeal was taken. Held: Affirmed.
The trial court had said that this proceeding was to force
the father to provide for the son on a scale, and in a manner,
more expensive than the father, in his judgment, felt called
upon to provide. It was there held that to entertain such
a proceeding would tend to foster discord and antagonism
in the family circle about a matter which, it would seem is
peculiarly and exclusively committed to the father as the
natural guardian. To allow a child to bring a parent into
court whenever the child's idea of standard of support is
not met or complied with, would leave the family relation
in a state of chaos. The trial court opinion also stated that
the amount stipulated in the separation agreement was completely adequate for a six year old infant.
On appeal, appellee argued that the lower court was
without jurisdiction because the matter of the amount
of maintenance to which the infant was entitled had been
adjudicated by the Pennsylvania court, and hence, under
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the
1 190 At.

753 (Md. 1937).
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United States' it was res adiudicata. The court disposed of
that contention by saying that the agreement between the
parties was embodied in the court order. As the agreement,
by its express terms, expired when the child reached the age
of three, neither the decree nor the agreement could apply
beyond the scope of their intent and purport and were not
necessarily conclusive as to a subsequent time on a different
state of facts. The Court said that, because the father had
not repudiated his duty of support, there was no jurisdiction in a court of Equity, under Article 16, Section 80, to
adjudicate the case.
The points of immediate interest are the capacity of a
child to secure a court order against the father for future
support; and the effect of a previous separation agreement
fixing the amount the child is to receive. In this case the
Court of Appeals said that although the parties had been
living apart, the custody of the infant had meanwhile evidently been adjusted through the mutual agreement of its
parents, and during the period of the existing custody the
father had contributed the sum of $50 per month for the
support of the child. At common law the moral obligation
to support the child during its minority rests upon the
father; and this obligation continues, without regard to a
divorce decree, unless by virtue of that decree the court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter orders otherwise.
The earliest reported Maryland cases all clearly hold
that a father is under a moral and legal obligation to maintain his infant children and if someone performs this
natural duty for him the father is liable to pay a reasonable
sum to the person performing.'
The liability of the father for support of the infant children continues until they reach majority or are self supporting. In Blades v. Szatai4 the plaintiff wife got a divorce
from her husband. The court granted the wife the custody
of the child and ordered the husband to pay a weekly sum
for the child. After the husband's death the wife sued his
estate both for the balance then due and for future payments until the son reached his majority. The court said
the father was under a common law obligation to support
his child during its minority and this obligation continued
without regard to a divorce decree, unless in that decree
I U.

S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 1.
Addison v. Bowie, 2 BI. 606 (1830); Thompson, et al., v. Dorsey, et al.,
4 Md. Ch. 149 (1853). The liability is not extended farther back than the
parent, Ellicott v. Peterson's Executors, 4 Md. 476 (1853), 9 Md. 52 (1856).
' 151 Md. 644, 135 Atl. 841, 50 A. L. R. 232 (1926).
3
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the court should order that it be supported by someone other
than the father. The fact that he had to pay a stated sum
for support in no way affected his common law obligation
to support the child, but only prescribed the amount to be
paid for its support and through whom the child was entitled
to receive it. But at the death of the father his obligation
to support the child ceased. This case also pointed out that
a divorce decree does not impair the common law obligation
of the father to support the child unless the decree states
otherwise. Even if the custody of the children is taken away
from the father by a court of competent jurisdiction, his
duty to provide for their maintenance continues. In Alvey
v. Hartwig,5 where the plaintiff was granted a divorce a vinculo and was awarded the care and custody of the two minor
children, she was allowed to recover sums expended for necessaries for them. So, as to third persons and as between
husband and wife, the father's responsibility is primary and
the mother's has been considered secondary; and, no other
facts or circumstances intervening, under the common law
the mother can compel the father to provide for his children
to the relief of herself. It is arguable, however, that a recently enacted statute6 declaring both parents equally to be
the natural guardians of their children and charging them
equally with their "care, nurture, welfare and education"
has the effect of making the mother as much responsible for
the child's expenses, if she have funds, as the father.
One of the ways for this liability of the father to be enforced is for a third person, who may even be the wife, to
furnish necessaries to the infant and then to sue to be reimbursed by the father. In the case' previously cited the wife
was allowed to recover money she had expended for necessaries for the children. In Boggs v. Boggs8 the wife was
granted a divorce and also the custody of the infant child.
She sued the father, at law, for moneys expended by herself
for support and education of their infant son. The court,
citing Alvey v. Hartwig again, said that even after a divorce
where custody is taken away from the father his obligation
to provide for their reasonable support continues. In suing
the father for the recovery of debts previously incurred for
the benefit of the child it is necessary that the suit be
brought in a court of law, rather than in a court of Equity
as was unsuccessfully attempted in Kriedo v. Kriedo.9 If,
' 106

Md. 254, 67 At. 132, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 678 (1907).
Code Supp., Art. 72A, Sec. 1.
I Alvey v. Hartwig, supra, note 5.
3 138 Md. 422, 114 At. 474 (1921).
' 159 Md 229, 150 AtI. 720 (1930).
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as pointed out above, the recent Maryland statute makes
the mother jointly responsible with the father for the child's
support then it would seem that she could only recover from
the father half the amount she had expended for the child's
necessaries.
However, this method of obtaining support for the child
is in many ways tactically disadvantageous. First, there is
always the possibility of not being able to collect from the
father once the money has been expended. Perhaps the
court will decide that what were considered necessaries
actually were not. Then again this method is awkward because of the troubles in every law suit, i. e., time and money.
Suit must be brought each and every time money has been
spent. To the attorney for the plaintiff, the situation is not
the most desirable because of the problem of collecting his
fee. On the whole, because of the time, expense, amount of
litigation involved, and uncertainty surrounding the whole
proceeding it is the type of remedy that should be used only
when no other remedy is available.
The alternative to suing to recover for past debts is to
secure a court order for future payment. This usually disposes of the matter quickly, somewhat less painfully, and
with much less uncertainty of litigation. In such a case the
wife is sure of the amount of money she will receive every
month, and does not have to worry whether she is spending
it for what a court may not consider necessaries.
One method of obtaining such a court order for future
payments is through criminal prosecution. The statute, °
in brief, provides that when one, without just cause, deserts
or wilfully neglects to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife or minor child he is guilty of a misdemeanor. Instead of imposing punishment, the Court, in its
discretion, may pass an order directing defendant to pay a
certain sum weekly for the space of three years to the wife.
The defendant is then released from custody, on probation,
for that period. 1 By the words used in the statute the
remedy is only applicable after desertion or wilful neglect
on the part of the husband. Criminal punishment cannot be
used to aid a wife in enforcing payment of support for children when that support has been granted by an equity court
in connection with a suit for divorce, or otherwise, because
Md. Code and Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Sees. 87, 88, 89.
"1Under Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Secs. 87, 87A to 87E, inclusive, a separate procedure Is set up for Baltimore City, whereby the bulk of these cases
may be handled in the State's Attorney's office without the necessity of a
court hearing. This procedure was provided in order to expedite matters
and avoid crowded court dockets.
21
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of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt. In Bushman v. Bushman12 the Court laid down the
rule that though provisions for the support of the children
and maintenance of the wife are commonly included in the
same decree, those for the support of the children are not
alimony, and consequently that part of the decree is within
the protection of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and obedience thereto cannot be enforced by imprisonment as for contempt of court.
There are two other statutory methods available for securing a court order for future payments. The first is under
the divorce statute" which states that where a divorce is
sought the court hearing the case shall have full power, in
all cases in which the care and custody of the children of
parties forms part of the relief prayed, and whether a
divorce is decreed or denied,' to order and direct who shall
have the guardianship and custody of the children, and be
charged with their support and maintenance and may at any
time thereafter annul, vary, or modify, such order in relation to the children. The case of Simmont v. Simmont"'
interprets this statute. There the wife sued for permanent
alimony, and the husband filed a cross bill for divorce which
was refused. The court had the power to determine the
custody of the infant children and who should be charged
with their support by force of the statute. So, under this
statute there must be a suit for divorce and care and custody
of the children must form part of the relief prayed before
the court has jurisdiction to render a decree for future
payment. It is immaterial whether a divorce is granted.
Plaintiff in the Yost case was unable to invoke the aid of this
statute because she was already divorced by a Pennsylvania
court and as she was neither seeking nor had secured a
divorce in Maryland this statute gave no jurisdiction to
vary or modify the amount of support granted for the
children.' 6
The other method of obtaining a court order for future
payments is through the general custody statute17 which
Md. 166, 145 Ati. 488 (1929).
l' Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 39.
14 Prior to the passage of the statute cited in the preceding footnote, the
rule was that the divorce court could only adjudicate the custody and
support of the children when a divorce was granted, Murray v. Murray, 134
Md. 653, 107 Atl. 550 (1919).
5 160 Md. 422, 153 Atl. 665 (1931).
2o Had the divorce been granted in Maryland, then, of course, the court
granting it would have had jurisdiction to hear a petition to re-open the
question of the amount of support to be awarded the child. Md. Code,
Art. 16, Sec. 39; Bowers v. Bowers, 135 Md. 453, 109 Atl. 111 (1919).
17 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 80.
1*157

YOST v. YOST
provides that the Equity courts of this state shall have original jurisdiction in all cases relating to the custody or
guardianship of children and may on bill or petition filed by
the father or mother or relative or next of kin or next friend
of any child or children direct who shall have the custody or
guardianship of such child or children and who shall be
charged with his, her, or their support and maintenance. In
Barnardv. Godfrey"8 the father filed a bill for custody under
this statute. The parties had been divorced by a Pennsylvania court, but the court made no provision for the guardianship of the children and awarded no alimony. The
Maryland Equity court not only awarded the custody of the
two minor children to the wife but also decreed that the
father should pay $200 per month for their support until
they attained the age of twenty-one. The court said that
Equity courts have full power to determine custody and
support of minor children whether the parents of the children have been divorced or are living apart. Jurisdiction
was given the court under the statute because this was a suit
for custody and, therefore, the court had power to grant an
order for future payments. But since the statute may only
be invoked when there is a suit for custody of the children,
and as the nominal plaintiff in the Yost case already had
custody and was merely asking the Court to raise the
amount of the support the Court had no jurisdiction under
that statute to grant the relief sought.
Thus it is that a court order for future payments may be
secured only in a criminal prosecution, or in a divorce case
where care and custody of the children forms part of the
relief prayed, or in a proper custody case under the Equity
jurisdiction. As the Yost case came under none of the
above headings, there was no jurisdiction to hear the case.
The other point of interest is: Given appropriate jurisdiction to inquire into the amount the father should contribute for the child, either in a court that can make an order
for the future, or in a suit at law for reimbursement, what
will be the effect of a separation agreement between the
spouses fixing the amount which the father should contribute
for the child's support?
In Kriedo v. Kriedo"9 the court said that parties to
divorce proceedings cannot by agreement between themselves limit the amount necessary for the support and maintenance of their minor children, so as to bind the courts.
The court may set the amount agreed upon and incorporate
1 157 Md. 264, 145 At. 614 (1020).
1

Sutva, Zrote 9..
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it in the decree, but it has the power to change or modify
the decree in this respect when it shall be satisfactorily
apparent that new or changed conditions or circumstances
make a modification necessary. In the Boggs case,"0 during
the pendency of the divorce proceedings and before final
decree the parties entered into an agreement for support
and maintenance of wife and child. The court said that in
determining the validity and effect of such agreements the
court will treat the welfare of the child as the paramount
and*controlling consideration. 1 The wife has a right to
sign away her rights under a deed of mutual separation
which may be executed in lieu of all other claims. So long
as the terms of the deed are complied with by the husband,
it exonerates him from the obligation to support his wife,
and is a protection against any claim which can be made
upon him for supplying her even with necessaries." However, in Bowers v. Bowers,2 husband and wife entered into
a separation agreement whereby the wife discharged the
husband from all future claims for support and maintenance of their infant child. Later she sued for divorce
which the court granted and the court also ordered the husband to pay a weekly sum for the support of the child. Two
years later she asked, in Equity, for more money for support of the child. The court decided that the divorce decree
established the obligation of the husband to contribute for
the support of the child. Thus it is that a separation agreement limiting the amount of support a wife is to receive
will be enforced but one limiting the amount to be received
by a child will not be.
The recent Maryland Statute" governing separation
agreements specifically provides that any stipulation regarding support of the children shall be subject to modification by a court having jurisdiction over the question of
support.
If the plaintiff in the instant case had been able to go
into a court having jurisdiction to make an order for future
support, the separation agreement would have presented
no obstacle to the court's award of an increased amount,
had the facts called for it. Under the principal case, however, a court order for future support can only be secured
in a criminal proceeding, as an incident of a Maryland di20 Supra, note 8.

136
"1See, to the same effect, Melson v. Melson, 151 Md. 196, 134 A.
(1926).
"Brown v. Brown, 5 Gill 249 (1847) ; Brown v. Brown, 2 Md. Cab 316
(1846) ; Md. Code Supp., Art. 16, See. 30A.
98Supra, note 16.
2 Md. Code SupP., Art. 16, Sec. 39A.

COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO. v. BENSON CO.
vorce suit, or where a change of custody is sought by direct
proceeding in equity. The situation in the principal case
raises the question of the desirability of a legislative change
to make it possible to receive a court order for future support-as distinguished from the more awkward reimbursement for necessaries advanced-without a criminal prosecution, a divorce suit, or proceeding to change a present
custody.
In favor of the change is the argument that if it is desirable to award future orders in those situations, it is equally
desirable to award them in any situations where it is
necessary to go to court to compel a father to perform his
duty to support his child. Against such a change is the
point that the future order is a drastic procedure, to be
availed of only in the more stringent situations which are
apparent when it is necessary to prosecute a father criminally, or where the parents are being divorced, or where a
change of custody of the child is imminent. As was pointed
out in the trial court opinion in the Yost case, to permit the
award of future support when there is not happening any
such drastic and abrupt event might tend to impair the harmony of happy family life.
But then it might be argued that, as long as we have by
statute legalized separation agreements which provide for
future support, we should also make provision for handling
situations where the spouses cannot agree on the regular
amount of support for children.
LOAN DISTINGUISHED FROM AGENCY-LIABILITY
OF LENDER AS PRINCIPAL ON CONTRACTS MADE
BY BORROWER WITH THIRD PARTIES
Commercial Credit Co. v. L. A. Benson Co.'
Defendant-appellant, a commercial loan corporation, advanced money to the Poole Engineering Company which was
a manufacturing corporation, to be used by the latter in
carrying out its contracts for the construction of voting
machines. The defendant was to receive interest on the
loan and a certain bonus for each machine made. The Poole
Company later encountered difficulty in completing the machine contracts and the defendant agreed to furnish more
money upon the stipulation that it be allowed to place two
representatives in the manufacturing plant to check on the
1170 Md. 270, 184 At

236 (106).

